Post by afilter on Feb 4, 2011 14:36:45 GMT -5
I started this thread awhile ago and now it is time to finish it as the first of a series of War Plan Orange Scenarios.
History
Reference:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Orange
War Plan Orange (commonly known as Plan Orange or just Orange) refers to a series of United States Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Japan during the years between the First and Second World Wars. The plans were begun informally in 1919 and formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924. Predating the Rainbow plans, which presumed the assistance of allies, Orange was predicated on the U.S. fighting Japan alone. It anticipated a withholding of supplies from the Philippines and other U.S. outposts in the Western Pacific (they were expected to hold out on their own), while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California, and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal. After mobilization (the ships maintained only half of their crews in peacetime), the fleet would sail to the Western Pacific to relieve American forces in Guam and the Philippines. Afterwards, the fleet would sail due north for a decisive battle against the Imperial Japanese Navy, and then blockade the Japanese home islands. This was in keeping with the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War II, in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets[2] (as they had been for over 300 years).
The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter-plan to allow the US Pacific Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines and carrier attacks to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a battle against the weakened U.S. fleet in a "decisive battle area", near Japan (see Kantai Kessen), also in line with Mahanian doctrine, which Japan had enthusiastically embraced. It was the basis for Japan's demand for a 70% ratio (10:10:7) at the Washington Naval Conference, which was considered necessary to provide Japan superiority in the "decisive battle area", as well the U.S.'s insistence on 60%, which amounted to parity.
Background
This scenario is a what if scenario that takes place in early 1942 assuming the Attack on Pearl Harbor did not take place, but the Japanese have invaded the Phillipines as planed and the American and Filipinos are holding out on Corregidor waiting for relief.
Scenario
The U.S. fleet has sortied from Pearl Harbor under the direct command of Admiral Kimmel as planned with its massive Logistics train in support for the over 5,000 mile journey to the far off Philipines in releif of General MacArthur and is beliguered defenders.
As the fleet moved within range of the Marshall Islands it fell under heavy land based air attack. On the morning of April 10th land based planes launched a decisive attack on the approaching American fleet.
The valiant flyers of The USS Enterprise (fighting Six) flying cap drove off many but several Kates made it through scoring two hits on the USS West Virginia and one onUSS Arizona before being driven off.
As Admiral Kimmel assessed the situation he quickly realized the two Battle wagons now slowed down even further would not be able to make the rest of the journey with the fleet due to the damage they had sustained and their reduced speed.
Late in the day he ordered Admiral Kidd on the USS Arizona to take command and the two giants swung out of line and turned around to head back to Pearl with the few escorts that could be spared.
Unknown to the Americans Admiral Nagumo was well aware of their situation as he had left Truk 3 days earlier and was now sailing a parallel course south of the American Fleet waiting for the oportune time to strike.
With reports of the damaged Battleships in from his sceening subs Nagumo realized now was the opportunity to defeat the Americans in part while they are weakened.
Naumo quickly decided to dispatch a task force to deal with the Admiral Kidd and his srticken Battleships in the night while his Main force continued to stalk Admiral Kimmel and wait for the oportune time to strike.
The man he chose for the job was Admiral Kurita a masterful cruiser commander. Kurita with his task force of fast Battleships and Cruisers would hunt down the crippled Americans and finshi them off.
Before Kurita departed Nagumo addressed the fleet.
April 12, 1942 – Address of Admiral Nagumo to officers of the First Strike Force, on the eve of battle
“I know many of you have privately questioned Admiral Yamamoto’s daring gambit. Giving up the element of surprise and declining the opportunity to launch a preemptory attack was contrary to the doctrines we have followed since the Battle of Port Arthur in 1904, and counter to the instincts of many of us. But Yamamoto understands the United States, and he has argued persuasively against unnecessarily provoking the American people.
So instead of striking, we issued the Articles of Blockade on December 7, 1941. In them, as you know, the War Cabinet declared our intention to blockade the Philippine Islands, Guam and Wake Island in response to the U.S. oil embargo. But our diplomats sweetened the ultimatum with soothing words – stressing the regret with which we took this action, our desire to avert war and rebuild relations with the U.S., our recognition of U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, and our hope that our Axis partners would refrain from conflict with America.
Of course, the U.S. government declared our blockade illegal and announced their intent to challenge it. But we also know from their “free press” that there is widespread dissension in America as to the wisdom of courting war with us to defend China and Indo-China.
As Yamamoto predicted, the U.S. Pacific Fleet has gathered and sortied to try to break our blockade, either through intimidation or force. Clearly they are ill-prepared for the conflict ahead. Their doctrines for the use of concentrated naval airpower are inferior to ours and we expect to have mastery of the skies. And they have not developed the logistical train necessary to sustain operations in the Pacific if we can deny them use of their base at Manila.
Now it is time for Kantai Kessen – the decisive battle. We hope to provoke the U.S. into firing the first shot, but even if they don’t we are ready to take measures in our own hands – in the heat of battle it will be easy to blame America for aggression. Regardless we will use our submarines and airpower to weaken the Americans, and then sweep up the survivors with masterful torpedo attacks and the unstoppable power of our battleships. With their navy in ruins, blood on their own hands, and dissension among their citizens, America will long for peace. We will be in a position to dictate settlement terms which assure us our rightful place of leadership throughout East Asia and our rightful status as a leading world power.”
Shortly after Kurita swung his task force out of line and headed North East in pursuit of his prey.
Late in the Day on April 13th a Scout Plane form the IJN Tone reported sighting the Americans just over the Horizon. Kurita ordered full speed ahead. He would hunt his quarry and overtake them in the night.
Fortunately for the Americans they have spotted the lone scout plane as it dogded between the clouds. Shortly thereafter a report came in from the USS Dolphin SS-169 covering the American withdrawl. The Dolphin reported sighting at least 5 IJN Capital ships coming from the south heading in the direction Of Admiral Kidd and his wounded battlewagons.
Admiral Kimmel is now out of range to support with the carriers under Admiral Halsey. Enterprise ,Yorktown and Lexington will not be able to help Admrial Kidd in his time of need.
USS Saratoga has sortied from Pearl with small Task force to join up with the fleet after finishing a refit. She will be in supporting distance by late in the Morning of April 13th.
This will do the American no good this night.
Admiral Kidd knows he can not out run his pursuers so he has decided it is time to turn and fight while he is still able.
The Battle is on.........
Order of Battle
USN Force-Admiral Kidd[/color]
USS Arizona BB-39 (SSD5) Hull 113 Speed 4
USS West Virgina BB-48 (SSD13) Hull 118 Speed 4
USS Salt Lake City CA-25 (SSD156)
USSMontpelier CL-57(SSD226)
USS Marblehead CL-12 (SSD202)
USS Phelps DD-360 (SSD375)
USS Selfridge DD-357 (SSD372)
USS Bagley DD-386 (SSD397)
USS Jarvis DD-393 (SSF404)
IJN Force-Admiral Kurita
IJN Kirishima BB (SSD5)
IJN Haruna BB (SSD3)
IJN Tone CA (SSD77)
IJN Haguro CA (SSD61)
IJN Atago CA (SSD70)
IJN Yahagi CL (SSD106)
IJN Yukikaze DD (SSD 207)
IJN Isokaze DD (SSD196)
IJN Akitsuki DD (SSD 248
IJN Teruzuki DD (SSD257
Set Up Map
Under construction
Discussion........
History
Reference:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Orange
War Plan Orange (commonly known as Plan Orange or just Orange) refers to a series of United States Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Japan during the years between the First and Second World Wars. The plans were begun informally in 1919 and formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924. Predating the Rainbow plans, which presumed the assistance of allies, Orange was predicated on the U.S. fighting Japan alone. It anticipated a withholding of supplies from the Philippines and other U.S. outposts in the Western Pacific (they were expected to hold out on their own), while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California, and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal. After mobilization (the ships maintained only half of their crews in peacetime), the fleet would sail to the Western Pacific to relieve American forces in Guam and the Philippines. Afterwards, the fleet would sail due north for a decisive battle against the Imperial Japanese Navy, and then blockade the Japanese home islands. This was in keeping with the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War II, in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets[2] (as they had been for over 300 years).
The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter-plan to allow the US Pacific Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines and carrier attacks to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a battle against the weakened U.S. fleet in a "decisive battle area", near Japan (see Kantai Kessen), also in line with Mahanian doctrine, which Japan had enthusiastically embraced. It was the basis for Japan's demand for a 70% ratio (10:10:7) at the Washington Naval Conference, which was considered necessary to provide Japan superiority in the "decisive battle area", as well the U.S.'s insistence on 60%, which amounted to parity.
Background
This scenario is a what if scenario that takes place in early 1942 assuming the Attack on Pearl Harbor did not take place, but the Japanese have invaded the Phillipines as planed and the American and Filipinos are holding out on Corregidor waiting for relief.
Scenario
The U.S. fleet has sortied from Pearl Harbor under the direct command of Admiral Kimmel as planned with its massive Logistics train in support for the over 5,000 mile journey to the far off Philipines in releif of General MacArthur and is beliguered defenders.
As the fleet moved within range of the Marshall Islands it fell under heavy land based air attack. On the morning of April 10th land based planes launched a decisive attack on the approaching American fleet.
The valiant flyers of The USS Enterprise (fighting Six) flying cap drove off many but several Kates made it through scoring two hits on the USS West Virginia and one onUSS Arizona before being driven off.
As Admiral Kimmel assessed the situation he quickly realized the two Battle wagons now slowed down even further would not be able to make the rest of the journey with the fleet due to the damage they had sustained and their reduced speed.
Late in the day he ordered Admiral Kidd on the USS Arizona to take command and the two giants swung out of line and turned around to head back to Pearl with the few escorts that could be spared.
Unknown to the Americans Admiral Nagumo was well aware of their situation as he had left Truk 3 days earlier and was now sailing a parallel course south of the American Fleet waiting for the oportune time to strike.
With reports of the damaged Battleships in from his sceening subs Nagumo realized now was the opportunity to defeat the Americans in part while they are weakened.
Naumo quickly decided to dispatch a task force to deal with the Admiral Kidd and his srticken Battleships in the night while his Main force continued to stalk Admiral Kimmel and wait for the oportune time to strike.
The man he chose for the job was Admiral Kurita a masterful cruiser commander. Kurita with his task force of fast Battleships and Cruisers would hunt down the crippled Americans and finshi them off.
Before Kurita departed Nagumo addressed the fleet.
April 12, 1942 – Address of Admiral Nagumo to officers of the First Strike Force, on the eve of battle
“I know many of you have privately questioned Admiral Yamamoto’s daring gambit. Giving up the element of surprise and declining the opportunity to launch a preemptory attack was contrary to the doctrines we have followed since the Battle of Port Arthur in 1904, and counter to the instincts of many of us. But Yamamoto understands the United States, and he has argued persuasively against unnecessarily provoking the American people.
So instead of striking, we issued the Articles of Blockade on December 7, 1941. In them, as you know, the War Cabinet declared our intention to blockade the Philippine Islands, Guam and Wake Island in response to the U.S. oil embargo. But our diplomats sweetened the ultimatum with soothing words – stressing the regret with which we took this action, our desire to avert war and rebuild relations with the U.S., our recognition of U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, and our hope that our Axis partners would refrain from conflict with America.
Of course, the U.S. government declared our blockade illegal and announced their intent to challenge it. But we also know from their “free press” that there is widespread dissension in America as to the wisdom of courting war with us to defend China and Indo-China.
As Yamamoto predicted, the U.S. Pacific Fleet has gathered and sortied to try to break our blockade, either through intimidation or force. Clearly they are ill-prepared for the conflict ahead. Their doctrines for the use of concentrated naval airpower are inferior to ours and we expect to have mastery of the skies. And they have not developed the logistical train necessary to sustain operations in the Pacific if we can deny them use of their base at Manila.
Now it is time for Kantai Kessen – the decisive battle. We hope to provoke the U.S. into firing the first shot, but even if they don’t we are ready to take measures in our own hands – in the heat of battle it will be easy to blame America for aggression. Regardless we will use our submarines and airpower to weaken the Americans, and then sweep up the survivors with masterful torpedo attacks and the unstoppable power of our battleships. With their navy in ruins, blood on their own hands, and dissension among their citizens, America will long for peace. We will be in a position to dictate settlement terms which assure us our rightful place of leadership throughout East Asia and our rightful status as a leading world power.”
Shortly after Kurita swung his task force out of line and headed North East in pursuit of his prey.
Late in the Day on April 13th a Scout Plane form the IJN Tone reported sighting the Americans just over the Horizon. Kurita ordered full speed ahead. He would hunt his quarry and overtake them in the night.
Fortunately for the Americans they have spotted the lone scout plane as it dogded between the clouds. Shortly thereafter a report came in from the USS Dolphin SS-169 covering the American withdrawl. The Dolphin reported sighting at least 5 IJN Capital ships coming from the south heading in the direction Of Admiral Kidd and his wounded battlewagons.
Admiral Kimmel is now out of range to support with the carriers under Admiral Halsey. Enterprise ,Yorktown and Lexington will not be able to help Admrial Kidd in his time of need.
USS Saratoga has sortied from Pearl with small Task force to join up with the fleet after finishing a refit. She will be in supporting distance by late in the Morning of April 13th.
This will do the American no good this night.
Admiral Kidd knows he can not out run his pursuers so he has decided it is time to turn and fight while he is still able.
The Battle is on.........
Order of Battle
USN Force-Admiral Kidd[/color]
USS Arizona BB-39 (SSD5) Hull 113 Speed 4
USS West Virgina BB-48 (SSD13) Hull 118 Speed 4
USS Salt Lake City CA-25 (SSD156)
USSMontpelier CL-57(SSD226)
USS Marblehead CL-12 (SSD202)
USS Phelps DD-360 (SSD375)
USS Selfridge DD-357 (SSD372)
USS Bagley DD-386 (SSD397)
USS Jarvis DD-393 (SSF404)
IJN Force-Admiral Kurita
IJN Kirishima BB (SSD5)
IJN Haruna BB (SSD3)
IJN Tone CA (SSD77)
IJN Haguro CA (SSD61)
IJN Atago CA (SSD70)
IJN Yahagi CL (SSD106)
IJN Yukikaze DD (SSD 207)
IJN Isokaze DD (SSD196)
IJN Akitsuki DD (SSD 248
IJN Teruzuki DD (SSD257
Set Up Map
Under construction
Discussion........
