Post by aman on Jul 19, 2011 8:49:36 GMT -5
I think these have a bit of bearing on both the DD discussion and Night Fighting rules, and more.
"Concerning the formation of his surface ships, Admiral Scott specified that the cruisers were to "form DOG,"5 in order to facilitate signals, with the destroyers divided two ahead and two astern of the cruisers. The destroyers were instructed to illuminate targets as soon as possible after radar contacts, to fire torpedoes at large ships and direct shell fire at enemy destroyers and small craft. The heavy cruisers were to use continuous fire against small ships at short range, rather than full gun salvos with long intervals.
The third and fourth cruisers in the column (the Salt Lake City and the Helena) were, with the destroyers, to keep watch on the disengaged flank, and to open fire without orders from Admiral Scott.
The van destroyers were cautioned to observe changes of course by the cruisers should TBS6 fail, and to be alert for turn signals by TBS or blinker. They were specifically warned to keep the TBS adequately manned and the circuit as clear as possible. Emphasizing that Japanese gunfire would quickly follow searchlight illumination, Admiral Scott advised the use of counter-illumination and opening of fire without delay, He added that the danger of silhouetting one's own ship should be borne in mind.
Blinker tubes were to be dimmed, and to show blue or red lights; white lights were to be used only when necessary. TBS silence was to be maintained as long as feasible, although all ships were authorized to use TBS to report contacts.
Ships compelled to fall out of formation should do so on the disengaged flank, and proceed towards Tulagi if unable to make 15 knots. If consistent with the task, a destroyer screen would be provided. All ships were to be ready to tow or be towed. A ship becoming separated from the formation was not to rejoin until after requesting permission, giving bearing of approach in voice code. In the event of failure to rejoin during the engagement, ships would proceed to an agreed 0800 rendezvous.
In conclusion, Admiral Scott stressed the importance of maintaining formation to facilitate identification. All ships were to be alert for challenges, and to show night fighting lights with discretion. "
My deductions from reading this are:
- Scott feels that his CA/CL are his main fighting force
- The DD are support, and take risks like night illuminating b/c they are a less important asset,
- The CA/CL were to only use 2Bs on DD, and save the MBs for other Cruisers.
- There was a large concern about firing on one's own ships at night, and Scott didn't trust their ability to quickly ID ships at night, hence the emphasis on staying in formation, etc.
- He gave 'zones of fire' to the 3rd/4th CA, to "open fire on the disengaged flank without orders" if needed.
- Altho the column had two DD in the van, the CA were in charge of course changes and were the actual "leading ships" despite being 3rd + in the line.
All of which are something that should be considered in game terms. Perhaps with the Ammo Limit special rule one should not fire MB on DD unless they are making a torp run?
"Concerning the formation of his surface ships, Admiral Scott specified that the cruisers were to "form DOG,"5 in order to facilitate signals, with the destroyers divided two ahead and two astern of the cruisers. The destroyers were instructed to illuminate targets as soon as possible after radar contacts, to fire torpedoes at large ships and direct shell fire at enemy destroyers and small craft. The heavy cruisers were to use continuous fire against small ships at short range, rather than full gun salvos with long intervals.
The third and fourth cruisers in the column (the Salt Lake City and the Helena) were, with the destroyers, to keep watch on the disengaged flank, and to open fire without orders from Admiral Scott.
The van destroyers were cautioned to observe changes of course by the cruisers should TBS6 fail, and to be alert for turn signals by TBS or blinker. They were specifically warned to keep the TBS adequately manned and the circuit as clear as possible. Emphasizing that Japanese gunfire would quickly follow searchlight illumination, Admiral Scott advised the use of counter-illumination and opening of fire without delay, He added that the danger of silhouetting one's own ship should be borne in mind.
Blinker tubes were to be dimmed, and to show blue or red lights; white lights were to be used only when necessary. TBS silence was to be maintained as long as feasible, although all ships were authorized to use TBS to report contacts.
Ships compelled to fall out of formation should do so on the disengaged flank, and proceed towards Tulagi if unable to make 15 knots. If consistent with the task, a destroyer screen would be provided. All ships were to be ready to tow or be towed. A ship becoming separated from the formation was not to rejoin until after requesting permission, giving bearing of approach in voice code. In the event of failure to rejoin during the engagement, ships would proceed to an agreed 0800 rendezvous.
In conclusion, Admiral Scott stressed the importance of maintaining formation to facilitate identification. All ships were to be alert for challenges, and to show night fighting lights with discretion. "
My deductions from reading this are:
- Scott feels that his CA/CL are his main fighting force
- The DD are support, and take risks like night illuminating b/c they are a less important asset,
- The CA/CL were to only use 2Bs on DD, and save the MBs for other Cruisers.
- There was a large concern about firing on one's own ships at night, and Scott didn't trust their ability to quickly ID ships at night, hence the emphasis on staying in formation, etc.
- He gave 'zones of fire' to the 3rd/4th CA, to "open fire on the disengaged flank without orders" if needed.
- Altho the column had two DD in the van, the CA were in charge of course changes and were the actual "leading ships" despite being 3rd + in the line.
All of which are something that should be considered in game terms. Perhaps with the Ammo Limit special rule one should not fire MB on DD unless they are making a torp run?